

# LACAN'S ANSWER TO THE CLASSICAL MIND/BODY DEADLOCK: RETRACING FREUD'S *BEYOND*



*Paul Verhaeghe*

Seminar XX is Lacan's obstinate, almost heroic fight to leave behind the deadlock of the classical binary oppositions: body/mind, nature/nurture, sex/gender, and finally man/woman. It is a fight that continues Freud's original attempts, Freud who produced an alternative to this classical opposition without intending to or even knowing it. Indeed, in his theory, the split is an internal one, and the idea of an external agency is drastically reconsidered, hence, his ever-insistent internal topologies: conscious/unconscious, ego/id/superego, and the split in the ego itself. Both Freud and Lacan demonstrate that a binary opposition fails to get it right. Descartes' ideas about *res cogitans* and *res extensa* are too poor to get hold of the complex dialectics of the human condition.

The danger of this chapter lies in its interpretative aspect. Interpretation always belongs to the realm of secondary revision, the mania to understand, of which all analysts should be wary. It will become clear that secondary revision is especially germane to the subject of this chapter. It also will become clear that we cannot do without it: it does not stop not being written—that is one of Lacan's conclusions. This is all the more true because Lacan's seminars are “works in progress”—belonging to an oral tradition of teaching and thinking at the same time—which cannot be adequately rendered by any written transcription. The latter will always be “not-whole,” compared to the original that has disappeared, hence, the inevitability of interpretation. In my interpretation—there are others—I follow the basic, analytic rule: consider the text as

part of a larger text; all meaning has to do with the larger part. Seminar XX cannot be read and studied in an isolated fashion—it is one of the highlights of a larger series of seminars. And, as Lacan considered himself a Freudian, Seminar XX cannot be studied in isolation from the texts of Lacan's Other: Freud.

I address three questions in this chapter: (1) What does Lacan's theory have to say about the age-old body/mind deadlock? (2) What does this teach us about knowledge? (3) What relation does this have to *jouissance*?

In answering the first question, I argue that Lacan ultimately leaves the binary deadlock of the first question behind. For him, the "mind" and "body" are not in opposition but are instead in an open-ended dialectical relationship. This suggests that the "essentialism" versus "constructivism" debate is all too naïve. The body we "have" exists only through the mind; it is the Other that constructs the body. But in and through this construction, the shape of something else becomes clearer and clearer, something that is contained in the constructed body while simultaneously foreign to it. This idea of "something else" is not new: it has been studied for a long time, in a very typical manner—that is, in such a way that this something else is a mirror image of ourselves, a Being under our being, different but alike at the same time. Such an underlying Being must necessarily be supported by yet a further underlying Supreme Being, as a necessary ground and final point. Lacan denounces the deadlocks of this kind of reasoning. He presents us instead with what he calls a circular but nonreciprocal relationship that keeps going between two terms that contain but do not hold each other—from object *a* to body, to ego, to subject, to gender. Albeit in reversed order: the so-called "previous" comes into existence retroactively, starting from the "next" in which it ex-sists.

The second question arises insofar as reconsidering this binary deadlock is impossible without rethinking knowledge about it and, hence, rethinking knowledge as such. Lacan opposed a familiar form of knowledge to another form. The former belongs to the Other of the signifier and is monotonous, completely determined by what he coins the "phallic One." Traditionally the latter is situated in an outside, again in a mirror image, the supreme Other of the Other who keeps final Knowledge. Again, Lacan leaves behind this binary system: this unknown form of knowledge is not a separate something; it belongs to the Other as well, except it belongs to that part of the Other that is the "not-whole" part, the gap in the Other in which something else of this Other makes its appearance.

For Lacan, this also is a form of knowledge, albeit of a different kind, a knowledge of the Other of the body. The next question concerns the relationship between these two forms of knowledge. But the most important question for Lacan involves the way in which this other form of knowledge is inscribed. Indeed, if this other knowledge does not belong to the Other of the signifier, its inscription presents us with a serious problem. The answer to this question entails a rethinking of the theory of the unconscious.

Last but not least is the third question, first seen from a clinical standpoint: the deadlocks of pleasure. The pleasure principle fails, as Freud discovered soon

enough. Lacan describes another form of pleasure, operating from *within* phallic pleasure. This other jouissance stands outside of the signifier, outside of the phallic symbolic order, albeit from the inside. It is by no means a coincidence that Lacan needed the help of topology in order to demonstrate how “inside” and “outside” are continually part of each other. The Freudian idea of drive fusion (*Triebmischung*) receives a new illustration here. This other form of jouissance belongs to the “not-whole” part of the Other of the signifier. This means that this other form of jouissance can only be made clear through this Other of the signifier, albeit at the point at which this Other meets its limit.

These three subjects are not easy ones and cannot be treated in an exhaustive manner—indeed, from the very nature of the subjects, any form of exhaustiveness is impossible. It is no coincidence that Lacan evokes the idea of “infinity” several times in Seminar XX, and it is obvious that the three subjects are not in any way separate subjects. Isolating them is just another illustration of the way in which our symbolic cognitive system functions, that is, through the signifier.

### ENCORE: “VINGT FOIS SUR LE METIER, REMETTEZ VOTRE OUVRAGE”

#### JOUISSANCE

In Seminar XX, Lacan is concerned with a jouissance beyond the phallic pleasure principle, that is, the typical remainder after the failure of the sexual relationship. Notably, even the psychopathology of everyday life demonstrates the necessity of an “encore,”<sup>1</sup> which is sufficient proof in itself of the unattainability of its goal. On top of that, it seems that the two forms of pleasure Lacan articulates stand in opposition to each other, which is by itself sufficient for us to question the very nature of “pleasure.” Finally, the association he makes between the male and the phallic pleasure principle seems to raise the idea that the other form of pleasure belongs to woman.

The *familiar* pleasure, familiar also meaning “well known,” is phallic pleasure, to be expected on the masculine side. It must be noted that “masculine” implies the psychosexual position, not biological sex as such. Phallic pleasure is first of all pleasure through the signifier and, therefore, the sole pleasure attainable for the subject. The fact that this phallic pleasure is never enough is not caused by castration—here Lacan corrects Freud, for indeed it is symbolic castration that creates its very possibility. The not enough has to do with the jouissance that is supposed to lie beyond this phallic pleasure. The other jouissance may have to do with woman, but Lacan specifies that it is an asexual jouissance, hence, the relationship between subject and other jouissance is to be situated outside of the Other of the signifier and more precisely in that part where the Other is not-whole.

At this point, several basic questions arise, including who or what enjoys this other jouissance? And how and where is this other jouissance inscribed, if it does not belong to the Other of the signifier?

Lacan Lacan begins with a question: “Jouissance—jouissance of the Other’s body—remains a question” (Seminar XX, 11),<sup>2</sup> and he makes sure that it *remains* a question, avoiding the all-too-easy answers and making it clear to us why it has to remain a question. Indeed, his first answer brings yet another question: where does this jouissance of the body of the Other, as an answer to the Other of the signifier, come from? He offers us the idea of traces on the body, coming from a beyond that must have to do with life, death, and reproduction (ibid., 11–12, 32–33). He does not further elaborate on this (see Seminar XI), but stresses the fact that these traces are originally not sexual ones, their sexual character being secondary: “The body’s being is of course sexed, but it is secondary, as they say” (ibid., 11–12). Asexual in this context means not-phallic, hence, not signified by the symbolic.

This other form of jouissance has nothing to do with sexual pleasure, meaning phallic pleasure. It originates elsewhere and has to be understood as belonging to Being, except that the term *being* is redefined in a very serious way in Seminar XX. Lacan announces this at the very beginning of the Seminar, where he defines being as follows: “Where there is being, infinity is required.” This is understood as the opposite of the Other, where one finds the requirement of the One (ibid., 15).

Other jouissance concerns the “enjoying substance” (“the substance of the body”) (ibid., 26), which is confirmed, says Lacan, by analytic experience.<sup>3</sup> In this experience, jouissance appears as the correlate of the failure in matters of the sexual relationship (ibid., 55), meaning the failure of the fantasy as the substitution for the nonexistent sexual relationship. The idea of “correlate” is important. It does not imply independent of or opposite to; on the contrary, it evokes the idea of a kind of implication.<sup>4</sup> Seminar XX is one long elaboration of this implied otherness, each time in opposition to what it is *not*. Lacan thereby introduces an opposition that never becomes a real binary opposition. On the one hand, there is the jouissance through the signifier (i.e., through the pleasure principle—phallic pleasure). On the other hand, something has to be situated beyond this, *but at the same time incorporated into it*, something providing jouissance to the Other.

But the hard question concerns the status of this Other. It is impossible to place the Other of the signifier here, because this Other belongs to phallic pleasure. Lacan specifies: the part that enjoys involves the not-whole part, something that he still has to elaborate on at this (early) time of the Seminar, the not-whole *within* the Other, meaning that part of the Other that is other, that is not completely covered by the Other of the signifier. It is in that part that the traces, coming from an elsewhere, are operative.

Of course, it is very tempting to situate woman at this place, woman as the materialization of jouissance. It is the very same temptation in which courtly love found its origin, just like its counterpart—that is, the rejection of femininity by the Church, defamation (“diffâme”—defame; “dit-femme”—called woman, ibid., 79). Both reactions amount to the same thing: an attempt

to recuperate something by articulation, something that ultimately cannot be recuperated by the signifier. The first one resides with love, and the latter one sleeps with hate (ibid., 64). For Lacan, men, women, and children are nothing more than signifiers, there being no prediscursive reality in these matters (ibid., 34).<sup>5</sup>

Insofar as woman has something to do with this otherness, it lies beyond her subjectivity and thus beyond her possibility of saying anything about it. The post-Lacanian hype about “feminine jouissance” is nothing more than a hysterical attempt to recuperate something that cannot be recuperated, owing to its very nature. Lacan presents us with only one clear statement, although made almost casually, about the occurrence of this other jouissance in women. With this statement, he implicitly takes up anew his comments on that elsewhere, life in combination with death through reproduction. Insofar as this other jouissance appears with women, it has to do with her child: “She finds the cork for this jouissance [ . . . ] in the *a* constituted by her child” (ibid., 35). This seems to me to be a clear hint to rethink female perversion beyond the myth of maternal love.

This other jouissance, in its relation to the beyond, might very well be understood as an original one, a primary one within a linear perspective, followed by a later, second one. Lacan corrects this in a very explicit way. Primary does not mean “first” (ibid., 52–53). The not-whole is an aftereffect, *nachträglich*, only to be delineated by the impact of the Other of the signifier, which tries to establish a totalizing effect through the One of the phallic signifier.<sup>6</sup> As a result, this Other is condemned to a kind of double vision. Indeed, it wants to see by and through the signifier something that is precisely defined by this signifier as being something beyond itself, hence, its “cross-sightedness” (ibid., 71).

This reasoning leads us back to a central line of thought in Seminar XX: “‘The Other’ here is more than ever thrown into question” (39). Indeed, through the different classes of the Seminar, the status of the Other changes (ibid., 21). As this happens during the Seminar itself, as a result of Lacan’s work in progress, to study it becomes even more difficult. The main shift takes place in chapter VI, starting with the idea of “another satisfaction, the satisfaction of speech” (ibid., 61). This is then reversed, and by the end of the chapter, we read that the reason for “the being of signifierness” (beautiful paradox!) has to be identified in the “jouissance of the body” (ibid., 67). The Other, as the Other of the signifier, does not fill the scene anymore. It is the body, the “being of the body,” that enjoys, not the “signified body.”<sup>7</sup>

In the meantime, this other jouissance has changed sides. It does not belong to the “familiar” Other any more, the Other of the signifier. From now on, it belongs to the other Other, the Other of the body, albeit not the body of the mirror image. It seems that we are faced with an opposition between the Other of the signifier, on the one hand, and the Other of the body, on the other hand, which of course is not so new. The innovation resides in their redefinition beyond the Platonic binary psyche/soma schema. This jouissance of

the body may very well lie beyond the phallus; it nevertheless ex-sists within this phallic jouissance, and this has to do with *a*-natomy (ibid., 87).

This *a*-natomy demonstrates, again, that this jouissance is related to these traces, which attest to a corporeal contingency (ibid., 86). This demonstration takes place in a retroactive manner; it is only when these traces have become (secondarily) sexualized (i.e., phallicized) that they also become visible, along with the *a*-sexual remainder that ex-sists in them. This is the transition from (a) to (a)/-phi. Phallic pleasure, and especially the insufficiency of phallic pleasure, makes this remainder obvious. In clinical terms, beyond the truth (the failure of the sexual relationship), the Real makes its appearance. This remainder—"enjoying substance"—resides with the objects *a* (oral, anal, scopic, invocative), which are indeed by their use value not so much known as they are enjoyed but which garner exchange value during the nurturing process and hence become phallicized.<sup>8</sup> It is this exchange that introduces them into the dialectic between subject and (m)Other and in its wake into phallic exchange, but even in this exchange, they ex-sist as foreign bodies, Freud's *Fremdkörper*.

Who or what enjoys? By the end of the Seminar, it becomes clear that it is not being that enjoys—being as the mirror image of the subject—but something else, something infinite, for which (*a*) is the ever-failing denomination. Object (*a*) is only a semblance of being (ibid., 87). Even more so: "It (object *a*) only dissolves, in the final analysis, owing to its failure, unable as it is to sustain itself in approaching the real," and that is the truth (ibid., 87–88).

The riddle that remains, says Lacan, involves the economy of jouissance. Who or what enjoys? The answer never concerns a "who" but focuses on a "what." The other jouissance can only be defined in a negative way: it neither concerns gender, nor the Other of the signifier, nor being. Each time it has to be understood, not so much in a beyond but in the fact that all of the previous ones are not-whole; it is within this whole not-whole that it flourishes. Coming from a beyond (ibid., 101), it has to do with the combination of life and death within sexual reproduction. Its elaboration takes place within the dialectics of corporeal contingency ("to stop not being written"), necessity ("it doesn't stop being written"), and impossibility ("it doesn't stop not being written").

How is this jouissance inscribed? The inscription takes place on the body in a contingent way, coming from this beyond. The body is not the body of the mirror stage; it concerns the interaction gates of this body with the outside (see the particularity of the four objects *a*).<sup>9</sup> This contingent inscription on the body (Freud's "somatic compliance") must necessarily be taken up anew, by the speaking subject, in and through the articulation of the signifier, where it becomes impossible. Instead of a binary opposition, we meet with an open-ended dialectic. We shall re-encounter this dialectic later in this chapter.

*Freudian Antecedents* In Freud's work, we find the same clinical experience, although with a different elaboration. In his initial search for the truth with his hysterical patients, he encountered the Real beyond the reality of trauma. At

that time (letter to Fliess, September 21, 1897), Freud stopped and concentrated on the part that is the mere envelope of this Real, that is, patients' fantasies and their symptoms. Nevertheless, Freud already had a clear insight into the fact that something was wrong within the pleasure economy itself, independent of social and cultural inhibitions: "In my opinion there must be an independent source for the release of unpleasure in sexual life" (Draft K to Fliess, *Standard Edition*, Vol. I, 222). But he did not develop this insight any further at the time.

Twenty years later, after all possible elaborations and analyses of fantasies and symptoms (i.e., elaborations of the pathology of desire), Freud again encounters the Real. This time he grasps it much better: he reads it as something that lies beyond the pleasure principle. The failure of the pleasure principle is his formulation of what Lacan, half a century later, calls the failure of the sexual relationship.

In his elaboration, Freud hesitates to consider this factor as something that belongs to the economy of pleasure. He hesitates, because from his point of view, it is precisely something that works against the pleasure of the pleasure principle, thus presenting him with a major obstacle to therapeutic success. For him, it is first and foremost something traumatic. Indeed, it is the traumatic factor par excellence, a structural trauma in the sense that the ego can never get hold of it via word presentations.<sup>10</sup> Lacan echoes this idea when he talks about the "bad encounter" in Seminar XI. Strangely enough, in Seminar XX, he speaks about an encounter with love in a more optimistic way, although he adds that this requires courage (Seminar XI, 64; Seminar XX, 87, 132) and leads to a form of ethics beyond sex (Seminar XX, 78).

For Freud, this structural trauma gives rise to repetition compulsion and traumatic dreams, which are nothing more than endlessly repeated attempts to introduce the traumatic Real into the word representation, to articulate this Real inside the secondary process and its bound energy.<sup>11</sup> But these attempts fail, and finally he formulates his theory of the life and death drives as an attempt to articulate something coming from a beyond.

This further elaboration can be studied in Freud's metapsychology. The similarities to Lacan's issues are striking. To summarize them: (1) The pleasure beyond the pleasure principle is, for Freud, impossible to articulate; indeed, outside of the pleasure principle also means outside of the secondary process and the binding to word presentations, which makes it an unbound primary process of energy. As a result, it cannot be discharged through the use of words. This evokes Lacan's idea of infinity. (2) In Freud's work, there is no linear sequence or binary opposition; on the contrary, Freud describes a fusion, which he tries to understand with his last drive theory: the fusion between Eros and Thanatos. The other *jouissance* ex-sists within phallic *jouissance*. (3) The consequence of the impossibility to signify this traumatic *jouissance* nevertheless entails an endless attempt to signify it (repetition compulsion), but the impossibility to interpret it (for lack of a signifier), and hence to analyze it, remains. As

a result, analysis becomes interminable, because analysis as such cannot gain access to this problem. The endless phallic interpretations circle around the not-whole of the phallic order, delineating it without signifying it.

For Freud, the *jouissance* beyond the pleasure principle is first of all related to trauma. It is interesting to note that this also was Lacan's first approach to the Real. His conceptualization in Seminar XI is so crucial with respect to Seminar XX that we must consider it here. It will permit us to bridge the distance between Freud and Lacan and provide us with a better understanding of Seminar XX as well.

At the time of Seminar XI (1964), the Lacanian audience is under the spell of the signifier, the opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic, between empty speech and full speech. But they are in for something new, something real.<sup>12</sup> Right from the beginning of the Seminar, Lacan introduces them to another kind of unconscious, the unconscious of the *Unbegriff*, the not-understandable, the nonconceptual (Seminar XI, 26), represented by the cut or gap and operating in a causal manner (*ibid.*, 21–22). Lacan's elaboration introduces an interaction between the automaton (the network of signifiers) and the *tuché* (the real). In the terms of Seminar XX, the network of signifiers is the Other of the signifier, and the *tuché* or real is the other *jouissance*. The automaton is organized, contains verbal thoughts, and illustrates the function of recollection. Owing to its organization, recollection works perfectly, automatically, although only up to a certain point (Seminar XI, 49). This is best illustrated by the productions of the unconscious, which always demonstrate a failure, an impediment at that particular point (*ibid.*, 25). This point is not so much a point but should rather be considered a discontinuity (*ibid.*), that is, the causal gap of the unconscious as such. Lacan describes this unconscious as unborn and unrealized (*ibid.*, 23), hence, pre-ontological: "It does not lend itself to ontology." "Manque-à-être," lack of being, is the word for it (*ibid.*, 29).

At this gap, where recollection fails, something else enters the scene, something that repeats through the repetition compulsion. This something else is the real "which always comes back to the same place" (*ibid.*, 49). This meeting between the network of signifiers (the Other) and the real (the other *jouissance*) is always a failed meeting. It is the failed meeting between reality and the real, on very particular points. Indeed, reality (constructed by the symbolic, by the Other), is *unterlegt*, *untertragen* (supported, sustained) by radical points in the real, which is thereby condemned to painful pending ("en souffrance," Seminar XI, 55). These radical points are the asexual traces from Seminar XX, with which the network (the Other) fails to meet. Insofar as the subject thinks (in signifiers), he or she does not meet the real (of the other *jouissance*).

This was already made clear by Freud's study of traumatic neurosis, to which Lacan refers. But in Lacan's conceptualization, this impossible although necessary relationship between *tuché* and automaton attests to the very nature of the unconscious. This is the unconscious as causal gap, *obliging* the Other to the automaton of articulated thinking in order to master something beyond



this kind of thinking as such. Automaton and tuché are two sides of the same coin that can never meet but are bound to try. Automaton is the not-whole, the not-enough of the network. Tuché is the real as the “unassimilable” (Seminar XI, 55), but Lacan specifies it. It is the Real of the drive, “the drive to come” (ibid., 60). Indeed, dream analysis demonstrates that the most important characteristic of the drive is its lack of representation; we meet only with a substitutional representative, a replacement representative (“un tenant-lieu de la représentation,” my translation, Seminar XI, 60), through which the failure, the impediment of every production of the unconscious, becomes obvious. Lacan concludes that the question of the real and reality must be studied anew (Seminar XI, 55). Seminar XX is one of the major results.

*Conclusion* The other jouissance ex-sists within phallic jouissance, functioning as a foreign body. It causes an inner split in the subject. If there is any opposition with something external, it concerns a vague “beyond.” Freud’s theory on Eros and Thanatos reappears in Lacan’s attempt to differentiate between “the advent of living” and “the advent of the subject,” especially in his attempt to study the dialectic between the two forms of jouissance and their relation to the signifier.

In view of the close relationship between phallic pleasure, the pleasure principle, and the signifier, it is obvious that knowledge is patent in these matters. The subject knows “everything” about this. The question that remains involves the relationship between the other jouissance and knowledge. Is there something to know about this other jouissance and, if so, who knows it? This last question necessarily implies a reconsideration of the relationship between the unconscious and knowledge as such.

#### KNOWLEDGE

The subject’s “wish to know” (Foucault’s *volonté de savoir*) is always suspicious. The subject knows everything it has to know and assumes the existence of the same knowledge in the Other. Based on this mirroring, it provides itself and the Other with being, with a substantial identity. The crack in such a mirror was made clear earlier—in spite of this supposedly whole knowledge, there is a form of jouissance that escapes from this totality. The subject produces in this respect a mere *mi-dire*, a half-telling of the truth, thus meeting with a not-whole in truth itself. The not-whole of the Other is here displaced to a not-whole in articulated knowledge.

This leaves us with the following questions: What is the status of the Other in this other knowledge? How does this other knowledge become inscribed if it stands outside of articulated, signified knowledge? What is the relationship to the unconscious?

*Lacan* Lacan reads the history of knowledge as a history of an increasing de-centering and desexualization. The Copernican revolution is not a genuine revolution, he says, because it keeps the idea of a center intact. The genuine

revolution comes with Kepler, more particularly with the shift from the circle (with a center) to the ellipse (hence, without a center) (Seminar XX, 42–43).

The idea of this center in traditional (pre-)science always comes down to the assumption of being-in-the-world as a One—as a One that can have knowledge of this world through a mirroring process. Lacan denounces this reasoning in Aristotle's work. Indeed, Aristotle's assumption of such a being led necessarily to the assumption of a "supreme sphere" (ibid., 77). In Lacan's reading, this supreme sphere is nothing but an imaginary implementation of the jouissance of the Other, where woman would be situated if she existed (ibid.). In the Catholic interpretation of Aristotle, God took the place of this supreme sphere as the supreme Being. God became the center of all love and knowledge, to which all of the little beings belong in one way or another and to which they long to return. In this way, the Church saved both God and the father—and Freud produced the same salvation operation with his myth of the primal father (ibid., 99).

Such reasoning entails an endless mirroring process. It also produces the illusion of the existence of an underlying being that is supposed to possess the same knowledge as our own being. Beyond the thinking of the thinker lies the thinking of a hidden Thinker who keeps the reins in hand (ibid., 96–97). To Lacan, this is more a matter of tinkering, the brutal reduction of the Real to the One. Moreover, it is a reduction that provides not only the I and the being with an existence ("I am thinking, therefore I am") but the supreme being as well.

The knowledge that follows from this mirror operation—that is, the knowledge of traditional (pre-)science—is therefore always a sexualized knowledge, along with the accompanying deadlock. To put it differently, this form of knowledge is merely an attempt to come to terms with the nonexistence of the sexual relationship. As an example, Lacan refers to the relationship between form and matter, as described by Plato and Aristotle. In their theory, they always assume an impossible relationship between two terms which are nothing more than mere replacements for man and woman (ibid., 76). The working through of such an attempt leads to a predictable deadlock: owing to the lack of the sexual relationship, they end in an asexual reasoning: "The Other presents itself to the subject only in an *a*-sexual form" (ibid., 115). In this reasoning, again, the dreamt-of "two" of the imaginary sexual relationship is brutally reduced to the One. God is a sexless father, and the angels have no sex whatsoever.

The ultimate effect of such reasoning is that it keeps us away from the entrance to whatever may be of our "being," although its impasses could provide us access to it (ibid., 48, 108). Finally, this whole reasoning is only a philosophical development of the mirror stage, through which the ego fosters the illusion of a unified, substantial identity: "m'être/maître à moi-même," to be myself, to be master of myself, to belong to myself (Seminar XVII, 178).

Modern science leaves behind the very idea of a center and thereby also the mirror and sexualization. In mathematics, the concept of the One is not used in a fusional-amorous way anymore (i.e., as what makes up for the nonexistence of the sexual relationship) but indeed as a one. It becomes a letter that can be written down (Seminar XX, 46–47). The difference between that and the One of traditional pre-science is that this letter in modern science does not designate an assemblage—it *constitutes* one. In this way, modern science tries to create an entrance to the Real in a different manner (ibid., 118).

Lacan recognizes the same movement of desexualization and decentering in the very process of analysis. Through the process of free association, a psychoanalytic treatment automatically entails a decentering of the ego. Indeed, free association endorses the splitting of the subject, and it obliterates the idea of any center. Finally, this becomes the goal of analysis, along with subjective destitution. Analytical experience demonstrates that the so-called being is only a para-being, that the agent of every discourse is only an apparent agent, and that the very idea of substance has to be left behind (ibid., 43–44).

At the beginning of an analysis, the analysand “knows” and “understands” everything, through the mirroring process with the Other in the place of the one who is supposed to know. He or she understands everything through the phallic signifier, the  $S_1$ , which entails a reduction in terms of the One (ibid., 74–75). As a consequence, the a-sexual object *a* becomes sexualized, that is, phallicized, hence, the ever-present confusion between (*a*) and A (ibid., 77). This is the individual implementation of the mirroring process, mentioned above, in traditional science. The articulation of this knowledge leads the subject to talk endlessly about *d’eux* (i.e., “about the two of them”), once again to make up for the nonexistence of the sexual relationship—this with one eye still on the imaginary being in the mirror. But the unconscious also testifies to a knowledge that escapes from this kind of talk, and it is there that there is something to gain (ibid., 125–27).

Analytic treatment drives this articulated, sexualized knowledge to a liminal point where the subject encounters the difference between the truth and the real. The truth can only be half told and is limited by phallic jouissance. The latter is merely a semblance, an envelope around something else. This half telling warns us against the imaginary aspect of the symptom’s envelope and refers us to the Real beyond it. This Real, situated beyond and at the same time in the Symbolic, can only be inscribed by a deadlock of formalization. How is it possible to write something that does not belong to the phallicized symbolic order? Again, Lacan refers to the function of the letter without meaning, that is, mathematics as something that permits us to go beyond the brutal reduction in terms of the One (ibid., 85–87).

The question then is: What is there to know about this other knowledge, and how does this other knowledge relate to articulated knowledge? “What we want to know is the status of the Other’s knowledge” (ibid., 81). If the Other

knows through the articulated signifiers, then we enter the deadlock of the mirror stage again, this time resulting in *entelechy*, hence, the fact that the last quote has to be rephrased as a question: “Does the Other know?” (ibid., 82). The major difficulty in this respect, says Lacan, has everything to do with the eternal ambiguity of the term *unconscious* and its relation to knowledge (ibid.).

It is at this point in the Seminar that Lacan begins to try to define this “other” form of knowledge. Again, he evokes the idea of traces, inscribed in a contingent way on the body, that come from elsewhere. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that the grounding of this knowledge boils down to the fact that the *jouissance* of its acquisition is the very same as the *jouissance* of its experiencing: “For the foundation of knowledge is that the *jouissance* of its exercise is the same as that of its acquisition” (ibid., 89). The body (or rather parts of that body) “knows” something, because it enjoys this something, and this enjoyment brings about an inscription of both this knowledge and this *jouissance* on (part of) the body itself. This inscription does not belong to the signifying order (and, hence, not to the Other) but is brought about through what Lacan tries to understand with the “letter.” “Use-value” is much more important here than “exchange value” (ibid.), hence, the fact that Lacan, by the end of the Seminar, focuses on what he considers the most important question: learning how to learn; how is learning taught? (ibid., 128–29)

The acquisition of knowledge through “use-value” has nothing to do with being, but has everything to do with the letter. The letter, in this respect, must not be understood as a message. It has to be understood in analogy to a germ cell, the meaningless carrier of a further possible development (ibid., 89). This development will always be an attempt at recuperation of this letter by the articulated signifier, from the objects *a* (oral, anal, invocative, scopic) to *a/(-φ)* (fellatio, anal penetration, exhibitionism, telephone sex), from “use-value” to “exchange value” with the mother, with the motherly language. As Lacan said at the beginning of the seminar, these traces become secondarily sexualized, but this attempt at recuperation never succeeds completely and thus creates in the signifier and in the Other a part that is not-whole, through which the letter keeps ex-sisting as letter.

As a consequence, Lacan has to accept that the Other of the signifier does not know anything of it. This constitutes the not-whole part in the Other of the signifier: “It is the Other that makes the not-whole, precisely in that the Other is the part of the not-knowing-at-all in this not-whole” (ibid., 90).<sup>13</sup> Hence, the unconscious is not a thinking being but first and foremost an enjoying being who does not want to know anything of it (ibid., 95). This cannot be captured within traditional, articulated knowledge. Beyond the illusion of the mirroring, there is a “relation to being” that cannot be known. There is a discordance, a cleft between being and knowledge, on *our* side, that is, on the side of the subject where it is indeed not-whole (ibid., 108–9).

Having arrived at this point of his reasoning, Lacan feels obliged to question the very idea of being, and thereby the idea of essentialism. Being is a

mere supposition, based on articulation: "it is but a fact of what is said" (ibid., 107). Knowledge beyond articulation is literally and figuratively "inter-dit," in the double sense of the French, "prohibited," but also "said, evoked between the sayings as such" (ibid., 108). The question is, to which kind of Real does it give us access? (ibid.) For Lacan, this real takes the place of the ever-presumed being, a presumption based on the mirroring process. Lacan associates this real more and more with the body, albeit not the body constructed through the Other. He concludes: "The real is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious" (ibid., 118).

This knowledge is an enigma, demonstrated to us by the unconscious. Analytic discourse, on the contrary, teaches us that knowledge is something articulated. Through this articulation, knowledge is turned into sexualized knowledge and functions as an imaginary replacement for the lack of a sexual relationship, but the unconscious testifies especially to a knowledge that escapes the knowledge of the speaking being (ibid., 125–26). This knowledge that we cannot grasp belongs to the order of experience. It is thus effected by *llanguage*, the motherly *llanguage* that presents us with enigmatic *affects* that go far beyond what the speaking being can articulate through his or her articulated knowledge (ibid., 126).

The unconscious can be considered a way of coping with these affects, coming from the motherly *llanguage*. This *llanguage* contains the "stocheion," the primary letter of the alphabet of knowledge (ibid., 130), and it is this stocheion that has to be turned into a sign of the subject. Analysis must aim at reading these letters, beyond what the analysand says (ibid., 29–30). The analysand is supposed to be able to read, and to be able to learn to read these letters, through his or her analysis (ibid., 38). This provides the mysterious bridge between the a-sexual traces and the signifier, between knowledge and the subject. This sign can only be inaugurated through the operation of the master signifier,  $S_1$ , that ensures the unity of body and subject. The next step brings "exchange value," through which the subject becomes divided between the signifiers, and enters the dialectic of desire. Thus the unconscious is a way of coping with affects, coming from the motherly *llanguage*, by the application of the signifier One, which does not come from the body but from the signifier as such (ibid., 130–31). "There is One" (*Il y a de l'Un*). Hence, the remaining questions are, what does this One mean? From whence does it arise? (ibid.).

Lacan raises this question several times in the Seminar but does not come up with an answer. Indeed, he researches this question throughout his entire work, especially in Seminar XIX, ". . . ou pire," the one preceding *Encore*.

*Freudian Antecedents* The links to Freud are quite obvious and illuminating, in several respects. In the "Project for a Scientific Psychology," Freud had elaborated on the idea of "Bahnungen," meaning that psychological material receives an inscription through its usage.<sup>14</sup> Exchange value starts only later on.

In this text, Freud expresses this theory in pseudo-neurological terms. The same kind of reasoning reappears right from the very start of his theory of the unconscious, where he puts forward the hypothesis that the psychical material is inscribed in different layers, each time in a different scripture ("Niederschrift"). Each subsequent step in development requires a translation of the previous material into the form of inscription characteristic of the next layer. This in itself creates the possibility of defense: dangerous, unpleasurable material can be left behind in the previous layer with its own inscription. As it is not translated into the new form of inscription, it insists in a strange way.<sup>15</sup>

It is this theory that receives further elaboration with the concept of repression. It is important to acknowledge the fact that with this theory Freud introduces two different forms of unconscious, hence, two different forms of knowledge. Repression proper, literally "after repression" (*Nachdrängung*), targets verbal material, word presentations that have become unpleasurable. The process of repression takes the energetic investment ("cathexis") away from these word presentations, thus making them unconscious in the dynamic sense of the term. This investment is displaced to another word presentation, through which the return of the repressed takes place. This form of "after repression" grounds the "repressed unconscious" or the "dynamic unconscious."<sup>16</sup> Here it is not so difficult to recognize Lacan's, "The unconscious is structured like a language." Indeed, the repressed unconscious involves signifiers coming from the Other during exchange ("The unconscious is the Other's discourse"), based on desire ("Man's desire is the Other's desire"). This is the exchange value of the material. As signifiers, they contain a knowledge, also coming from the Other. This knowledge can be fully known through the return of the repressed. The subject knows "everything" in these matters, but it does not know that it knows. This knowledge concerns sexual, phallic knowledge, which leads Freud to his complaint that interpretation always comes down to the same thing.

This knowledge, which can be known, reaches a limit in Freud's thinking as well. However, beyond "after repression" lurks "primal repression," which belongs to another form of the unconscious and brings with it another form of knowledge. As a process, primal repression is first and foremost a primal *fixation*: certain material is left behind in its original inscription.<sup>17</sup> It was never translated into word presentations. This material concerns the "excessive degree of excitation," that is, the drive, the "Trieb" or "Triebhaft," to which Lacan refers when he interprets the drive as "the drift of jouissance" (Seminar XX, 102).<sup>18</sup> Based on this, Freud develops the idea of the Ucs system. This system exerts a force of attraction on the material of "after repression," that is, the material in the dynamic, repressed unconscious. From a Lacanian point of view, we read: the sexualized, phallicized, articulated material is attracted by the not-whole part within this articulated part, the (a) within the  $a/(-\phi)$ .

Contrary to the dynamic, repressed Ucs, there are no word representations in this Ucs system. The central question then is, is it the drive itself that is fixated, or does this fixation involve a primal form of *representation* of the drive?

Furthermore, is there any form of inscription? Freud calls it the “core of our being,” the “mycelium,” but he also hesitates.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, the question must be raised whether the latent dream thoughts are “present” somewhere, that is, inscribed, or if we should view them as originally nonexistent, meaning that dream formation takes the place of an originally missing process of psychical elaboration.<sup>20</sup> In the latter case, dream analysis does not boil down to the discovery of a hidden inscription. On the contrary, it amounts to an elaboration process involving signifiers, a process that takes the place of something that was originally not there.

It should be noted that Freud presents the same kind of reasoning when he discusses trauma: the traumatic effect of a trauma is caused by the fact that the trauma, when it happened, could not be put into words; it lacked an elaboration in the form of signifiers.<sup>21</sup> This tallies perfectly with Lacan's ideas in Seminar XI, where he understands the unconscious not as a substantial kernel but as a *cause béante*, a causal gap, in which something fails to be realized.

In Freud's work, there is no final discussion of the nature of the drive inscription in the system Ucs. According to Freud, it has to do with the idea of fixation in general and the body in particular, hence, his typical expressions: fixation, constitution, drive root, somatic compliance. These expressions appear in all of his case studies, and they are always associated with a form of infantile pleasure.

From 1964 onward, Lacan takes up the question anew and struggles with it. In the wake of the Bonneval colloquium, and the debate with Ricoeur and with his own students (Laplanche and Leclaire), he tries to elaborate on his answer. Laplanche and Leclaire put forward the hypothesis that the unconscious core contains a representational system: phonemes for Leclaire, imagos (sensory images without signifiers) for Laplanche.<sup>22</sup> Lacan ultimately refuses both answers and presents his own solution by developing a theory of object *a* and the letter. In Seminar XXII, *R.S.I.*, he takes up anew the idea of the letter as drive-representative in the system Ucs. The letter presents us with the particular fixation of the drive for a particular subject, but it cannot be signified in a definite way, meaning the way of the phallic signifier of the One. As a letter, it contains a knowledge, but this knowledge forms part of the not-whole part of the Other, thus making this Other ignorant of it. It is the Other of the body that remembers this knowledge and traces the same tracks each time (Freud's *Bahnungen*) within the economy of jouissance, but this economy of jouissance remains an enigma (Seminar XX, 105).

The importance of this conceptualization has to do with the final goal of analysis. If, in one way or another, the core of the Ucs system is of a representational nature, then it can be verbalized and interpreted during treatment. If not, then the final aim of the treatment has to be reconsidered, because “full speech” would be structurally impossible. In his final theory, Lacan chooses the latter option and elaborates on his theory of identification with the real of the symptom as the final goal of an analysis.<sup>23</sup>

*Conclusion* The other jouissance, which ex-sists as that part in the Other where the Other is not-whole, implies a knowledge that is acquired by the body through experiencing it. At the same time, this experiencing causes its inscription on the body. This knowledge concerns the not-whole part of articulated, phallic knowledge of the Other of the signifier. As knowledge, it does not belong to the Other of language or to a presumed underlying being. It can only be grasped through writing, although we must acknowledge the fact that every formalization meets here with a deadlock.

Associated with this, there are two forms of unconscious and two forms of knowledge. The Ucs system is the un verbalized gap that contains drive fixation and jouissance, thus operating as a cause. The Ucs system ex-sists within the repressed unconscious, where articulated knowledge can be known by the subject. The latter knowledge has to do with exchange value, and thus with the Other's discourse and desire.

The way in which the split is described between other jouissance and phallic jouissance and between articulated knowledge and other knowledge foreshadows a new topology. This topology is new, because it leaves behind the idea of a form of binary opposition. In what way, we might ask, can we elaborate on this new topology, in relation to the classic body/mind deadlock?

#### BODY/MIND

Ever since Plato, we have been faced with a binary opposition between body and mind. History contains several translations of this deadlock, of which sex/gender is the latest implementation. This last implementation of Plato's deadlock contains another one as well. Indeed, on the side of gender, we find the binary opposition between man and woman, albeit in a strange way. Gender was originally defined in terms of man versus woman, but its further development (by Judith Butler) gave rise to a scattering of gender as such, in a multiplicity of different forms of psychosexual identity. The paradoxical result of this scattering is that a return to the classic, safe male/female opposition within sex has been endorsed. Today, especially within the hard sciences, voices are heard everywhere defending this essential binary opposition in sex (biology, genetics, brain studies). Even more strange is the fact that this man-woman opposition within the original gender idea always brings with it a hidden reprisal of the opposition between sex and gender as such. The female sex becomes identified implicitly with "nature," by the idea of the primal mother, while gender and culture are implicitly understood as belonging to masculinity.

The question is, how can we rethink this binary opposition? Is there an association to be made with gender positions? And, finally, what about ontology?

*Lacan* Without exaggerating, I think I can assert that Lacan's Seminar XX is one long search to escape the deadlocks of this kind of binary thinking. The price to pay for this escape is the loss of the advantages of such an opposition.



Indeed, the latter brings an ever-imaginary clarity, hence, safety; even more so, it provides us with the illusion of a substantial being. Instead of this, Lacan introduces us to a fundamental in-determinism that lies at the heart of the matter itself. His search is not limited to Seminar XX. The problem appears for the first time in his talk on the mirror stage (1948). The innovation of Seminar XX is the association of this question to the problem of knowledge and *jouissance*. The innovation lies especially in the idea of negation, present throughout the Seminar, the “n’est pas” (“is not”), the “pas-tout” (not-whole), found frequently in sentences in the conditional tense. With this, Lacan delineates a relationship between body and mind that is completely different from the classical opposition. Finally, this relationship is generalized and understood as a basic structure for human beings. Before we go into that, let me summarize Lacan’s critique of this binary opposition, based on what I have said above.

His critique becomes quite clear (Seminar XX, 62 ff.) when he answers the critique of his own theory made in *The Title of the Letter*, by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. These authors ascribe Lacan an ontology and criticize him for it. Lacan’s answer is to the point. He states that, in his theory, there is a clear opposition between “the being of the philosophical tradition” and the experience that we are duped by *jouissance* (ibid., 66). More particularly, Lacan reads this as an opposition between “the signified of the body” and the “*jouissance* of being” (ibid., 66–67). Here we must pay close attention to his elaboration of the notion of “being.” In his reading, this “being” of *jouissance* stands in complete opposition to the classic being of the philosophical tradition, as it was elaborated on by Aristotle and Aquinas. Indeed, this classic elaboration always gave rise to the assumption of a supreme being.

Let us focus first on being in classical philosophy, “that is, as rooted in the very thinking that is supposed to be its correlate” (ibid., 66). Thinking grounds itself in the assumption that there is an underlying being that thinks as well—and this underlying thinking of an assumed underlying being has to ground itself in the assumption of a supreme being. If this is not the case, it has to end in an endless mirroring process of ever-more remote underlying beings, who all resemble each other. With this grounding in a supreme being, classical philosophy provides being with consistency.

Aristotle’s mistake—a mistake that was repeated by his followers—resides in the assumption that what is thought (*le pensé*) is in the image of thought (*la pensée*) (ibid., 96). The soul is the supposed identity of the body in an identicalness to this body: “being is supposed to think” (ibid., 100, 103), but such an assumption is based on the signifier holding the reins, the *dit-manche* (ibid., 96–97).<sup>24</sup> Lacan had already exposed the fallacy of such reasoning when he criticized the idea of neurological projection of the body onto the brain. If man has a headache, this has to do with the smaller man in his head having a headache, meaning that this small man must have an even smaller man in his brain who has a headache, meaning that a still smaller man in the head of the small man . . .<sup>25</sup>

Lacan rejects the idea of a corresponding analogy between body and mind, between being and subject, and he puts forward the idea of a gap “inscribed in the very status of jouissance qua dit-mension of the body” (ibid., 104). He adds that this is precisely what Freud was talking about. There is no being beyond the signifier, “nothing is, if not insofar as it is said that it is” (ibid., 126, 107). The discourse on being is only an assumption that lends it meaning and substance at the same time. In other words, the idea of a presumed correspondence between body and soul is nothing but a philosophical implementation of the mirror stage, by which the infant acquires a supposed identity and unity that originates in the Other of the signifier, the dit-manche. Being always comes down to a signified being, not to an ontological being. Even for analysts, object *a* seems to be being, but it is a mere semblance of being (ibid., 87). In the end, the assumption of such a correspondence is nothing more than a way of coping with the unbearable lightness of being (ibid., 78). It comes down to the creation of a guarantee of the assumed existence of the Other of the Other. The effect of all this is not that we get to know our being; on the contrary, we are shut off from the very possibility of learning anything about it.

Nevertheless, says Lacan, there is another relation to being that cannot be known through the articulation of signifiers, and it is this relation that he wants to investigate. The question is to which kind of real this relationship permits us access (ibid., 108). The aim of such an investigation is not so much to know more about it—indeed, in this respect, knowledge is literally and figuratively “inter-dit,” forbidden and said in-between—but that it would grant us better access to jouissance. In other words, it would produce a better agreement between jouissance and its end—this beyond its typical failure, that is, fucking and reproducing (ibid., 109). Lacan hopes to find an entrance to this via the traces “which constitute for the subject his slim chance of going to the Other, to its being” (ibid., 110). With this idea of “trace,” he is referring back to the earlier parts of the Seminar (11), and to the idea of the letter. Indeed, as a trace, it must be inscribed, but then again this leads us to the deadlocks of formalization, because there is no metalanguage (Seminar XX, 85, 108, 110). At this point, Lacan builds a bridge to topology, hoping that this will enable him to demonstrate something of this inscription (ibid., 110 ff.).

The above permits us to summarize Lacan’s answer to classical binary thinking as follows. The signified being faces a lack-of-being (*manque-à-être*) that is included in this signified being. In this way, Lacan puts forward a new kind of dialectic, beyond the mirroring reasoning of classical binary thinking.

In this reasoning, it is not coincidental that Lacan describes this lack of being systematically in negative terms, that is, negative from the point of view of the Other of the signifier, because it can never be expressed in signifiers. “Negation certainly seems to derive therefrom” (ibid., 101). Seminar XX is full of these negative statements, frequently in the conditional as well: “is not,” “not-whole,” and so on. Its point of culmination is without any doubt the

negative formulations of contingency, necessity, and impossibility. Contingency has to do with the inscription of certain traces on the body (Seminar XX, 86), through which the body enjoys, but these traces cannot be written in the sense of the signifier. Nevertheless, they are not *not* written either, albeit in a contingent way and not understandable or knowable for the Other of the signifier, hence, they “stop not being written.” This writing is necessary for the subject, but it should take place through phallic articulation, and precisely this articulation fails in this respect, hence, the never-ending aspect: “It does not stop being written.” As a result, we are faced with impossibility: because the traces have to be written on the body but can never be written in a signified way, the sexual relationship “does not stop not being written” (ibid., 85–87; 131–32).

This negative effect has everything to do with a certain characteristic of this impossible to grasp other dimension: its infinity (Seminar XX, 13, 15). This is one of the main differences from the closed symbolic universe of the phallic pleasure principle, which is closed because it reduces everything to the function of the One. So, in a very important remark made by Lacan in an almost offhanded manner (ibid., 93–94), we find the claim that the ever-impossible combination between the phallic and the other dimension, between the symbolic and the real, does not constitute a closed universe. If it were a closed one, this would imply that any particular exception to it could be considered just one exception, meaning reducible to the One. This is not at all the case. On the contrary, we are faced with an open-ended, endless universe in which exceptions do not belong to the order of the one but to the order of the not-whole. Infinity opens a dimension that cannot be caught in the order of the signifier, and it opens a beyond to which object *a* could provide us an entrance way. But even object *a* fails in this respect, “owing to its failure, unable as it is, to sustain itself in approaching the real” (ibid., 87).

In this way, Lacan introduces a totally different dialectic, one between the symbolic dimension of the individual and something that supersedes this dimension, coming from elsewhere. Throughout Seminar XX, he keeps alluding to this latter dimension (11, 32–33, 63, 89, 110), without developing it. Even more so, he demonstrates why it cannot be developed as such. This is why he concentrates on the open-ended dialectic between the two dimensions, between the “advent of the living” and the “advent of the subject,” as mentioned in Seminar XI. It has to do with life and death, in such a way that it supersedes mere reproduction, which is always a half-failed way to continue life. At this point, Lacan's theory is a further development of Freud's conceptualization of the life and death drives, Eros and Thanatos.

*Freudian Antecedents* Again, Lacan's theory has obvious links to Freud's. Right from the start, Freud puts forward the idea of an internal splitting, not between a mind and an external body but within a functioning whole. From his first conceptualizations onward, he associates this splitting with the (im-)possibility of representation of certain elements. For example, at the time of the *Studies on*

*Hysteria* (1895) he talks about *bewusstseinsunfähige Vorstellungen*, signifiers that cannot enter consciousness.<sup>26</sup>

This focus on such splitting is without any doubt the major difference between Freud and psychology. The latter always tries in one way or another to reintroduce the subject as a unity. That is the reason psychology is not psychology but egology. The focus on the internal splitting explains the difference between Freud and the post-Freudian “culturalists” (in the large sense of the word) as well, because the latter concentrate on an assumed split between the subject, on the one hand, and a restrictive culture and society, on the other hand. For Freud, this is an effect, not a cause.

The Freudian gap is situated on the inside, and the borderlines are delineated by the (im-)possibility of representation and articulation. “Hypercathexis” of the drive material through the association with word presentations makes consciousness possible, and vice versa; the dividing line has to be situated at that border. Freud’s entire work can be studied as an elaboration of this splitting in the representational and articulatory system. His topologies of the mind are attempts to acknowledge this gap: consciousness, preconscious, unconscious; dynamic unconscious, system unconscious; ego, id, superego. Lesser known but even more interesting for the study of Seminar XX is his differentiation between the affectionate current and the sensual one.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, this tallies quite well with Lacan’s remarks on love and the drives through all of Seminar XX.<sup>28</sup> Freud’s last conceptualization of the gap generalizes this splitting to a universal human characteristic, thus anticipating the idea of Lacan’s ever-divided subject.<sup>29</sup>

When we study Freud’s different attempts to acknowledge this inner split, it becomes obvious that time and again the main theme concerns the gap between the drive, on the one hand, and the (im-)possibility of representation, on the other hand, within the ego or the conscious that is organized in word presentations. In this respect, it is quite interesting to quote one of his attempts to define the drive: “The simplest and likeliest assumption as to the nature of drives would seem to be that in itself a drive is without quality, and, so far as mental life is concerned, is only to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon the mind to work.”<sup>30</sup> The work here is that which is required to insert this drive into the secondary process, into word presentations. This is Lacan’s necessity: the drive has to be represented in one way or another.

Thus Freud does not reason in terms of a binary but concentrates on a never-ending dialectical process between the represented and the not-represented. This is not only present from his very first writings, it receives more and more weight as his work proceeds. Right at the beginning, he talks about the “false connection,” meaning a word presentation that is incorrectly associated with another word presentation, for lack of an original correct association with something that is barely expressible.<sup>31</sup> His work on hysteria teaches him that such false connections are not exceptional; on the contrary, the hysterical subject produces them all the time, thus trying to enter this un-

expressible into the normal associative chains. This characteristic of hysteria is so obvious that he considers it typical and dubs it the hysterical "compulsion to associate."<sup>32</sup> Much later, he encounters another variant of this compulsion, that is, the repetition compulsion of traumatic neurosis, aiming at the mastering of the trauma by trying to bind it to word representations.<sup>33</sup> Still a bit later in his work, he does not restrict this anymore to hysteria but turns it into a general characteristic of the ego: its proclivity to synthesize, to associate separate things into an ever-larger synthesis. He had met with this proclivity earlier on, when he was studying dreams. Once awake, the dreamer tries to get hold of his or her dream and turns it into a story. This is "secondary revision," that is, the process by which all of the holes and gaps in the original dream are associatively closed and sealed. Furthermore, the dream as such is already an attempt to represent the unrepresentable, its main concern is "considerations of representability." The dream uses different mechanisms (condensation, displacement, and so on) to produce an "Ergänzungsreihe" (complemental series), just like Freud tries to himself, but the navel of the dream, the "Kern unseres Wesen," remains obscure.<sup>34</sup>

In the meantime, his clinical experience taught him that there is no chronological-linear sequence. Indeed, the unconscious does not know time. His famous archaeological metaphor illustrates the simultaneity, through which the so-called "later" contains the "past" in itself, albeit in a different representation.<sup>35</sup> The whole contains the not-whole that ex-sists in this whole. "Nachträglichkeit" ("deferred action") is the rule, foreshadowing Lacan's notion of logical time.

All of these Freudian descriptions of attempts at recuperation through the signifier come down to Lacan's "being of signifierness," which necessarily tries to write the contingent but produces impossibility. In Lacan's theory, not much attention is paid to the underlying motive—why does the subject feel obliged to introduce the drive into the symbolic—what drives him to do so? Freud tries to formulate an explanation by postulating the existence of two primary drives, in combination with the assumption of a basic characteristic of these drives, that is, that they want to return to a previous state.<sup>36</sup>

All of the attempts (from false connection to repetition compulsion) are effects of Eros, with its proclivity to synthesis, to the One, to fusion. For Freud, Eros aims at the reduction of tension through the secondary process, that is, the "abreaction" of bound energy, made possible by association with word presentations. At the other side, he finds another primary drive, which is much harder to get hold of and define, because it operates literally "in silence," that is, outside the dimension of word presentations.<sup>37</sup> It operates as a resistance, the same resistance that Freud discovered at the heart of the Ucs system itself against the conscious, that is, against the association with word presentations. The repetition compulsion collides with the same inertia, hence, its repetitive effect. This other drive, Thanatos, operates like the primary process, that is, unbound, and it causes ever-increasing levels of tension that cannot be "abreacted" for lack of an

association with word presentations. Thanatos induces a scattering of Eros, disassembles everything that Eros brought together into the One, and makes this unity explode in an infinite universe. The One of phallic fusion is pitted against the infinity of the beyond. Thanatos implies a pleasure as well, although in this case, it is experienced as an incomprehensible jouissance, as traumatic by the subject who cannot handle it in its usual symbolic way.

Again, it is not a matter of opposition for Freud—quite the contrary. It does not concern the life drive against the death drive; no, the two of them always appear together, in a strange mixture—the “*Triebmischung*,” drive fusion.<sup>38</sup> Defusion, says Freud, is very rare, and it appears only in extreme pathology. In terms of his previous theory, the repressed unconscious is part of the unconscious but does not coincide with it; there is still the Ucs system, the not-whole in the whole. Or, in terms of his earliest theory, the material fended off by the ego to another realm does not lie in an external outside. Instead, it continues to form part of the ego, albeit in such a strange way that Freud thinks it appropriate to use a medical metaphor: they are “*Fremdkörper*,” foreign bodies, present on the inside but foreign to this inside.<sup>39</sup> The real ex-sists within the articulated symbolic.

Finally, Freud has to refer to something that supersedes humankind as such, something that must have to do with the bare properties of life. He refers to *Philia* and *Neikos* as a basis for the fusional Eros and the defusional Thanatos, but in this respect, his reference to another classical couple is even more interesting: *Anankè* and *Logos*. *Logos* is, in effect, “reason,” but it refers to the signifier as well, and Freud associates it with knowledge. *Anankè* is the necessity from which we cannot escape.<sup>40</sup>

*Conclusion* For Lacan, there is no binary opposition between body and soul, between being and Other, between man and woman, between phallic jouissance and other jouissance. Each time we meet with an impossible relationship between two terms, in which one tries to regain the other but never succeeds, because this other is already included in the one, albeit by ex-sistence. It is the story of Achilles and Briseis all over again (Seminary XX, 13).

Instead of the binary opposition and its accompanying endless mirroring process, we find both in Freud and Lacan a dialectical process within a whole that contains a part with which it cannot cope, although it is driven to keep trying. The latter part ex-sists with respect to the former, thus turning it into a not-whole. It comforts itself with the illusion of being a finite universe, because it operates based on the principle of the one. The other part functions in a different way, thereby providing an opening to the dimension of infinity. The self-assumed whole amounts to a represented universe, with which consciousness and the pleasure principle coincide. The not-whole part of this whole is not representable in terms of this represented universe and produces another jouissance, which operates in a traumatic way for the representational system.

Thus considered, human ontology has no essential base whatsoever. The hoped-for essence comes down to an inner split, which gives rise to an open-ended dialectic.

## FINAL THOUGHTS

In my introduction, I suggested that Seminar XX cannot be read in an isolated way, because it belongs to a “work in progress.” In my conclusion, I address two points from a broader perspective in the hope of better situating them.

First, the best-known theme of Seminar XX is the relationship between phallic pleasure and the other *jouissance*, which reappears in the relationship between knowledge and that other form of knowledge or, more broadly speaking, in the relationship between the Other and the ever-assumed being. Based on Lacan's work as a whole, it is clear that this relationship comes down to a never-ending attempt of the One to assume that other, but every attempt fails and keeps failing, thereby causing the insistence of the attempt as such. This is called life. As I will demonstrate, this impossible relationship can be written in general terms and provides us, at last, with some kind of ontology.

The second point concerns causality. What is the cause of this insistent failure? Through the discussion of the different implementations of this impossible relationship (*jouissance*, knowledge, identity), it became clear that it contains a direction and an aim. Freud's axiomatic answer goes back to the drive and its basic aim—to return to a previous state. What is Lacan's answer here?

### CAUSALITY

As long as Lacan was concentrating on the signifier and the symbolic order, all emphasis was placed on the lawful, systematic determination within the chain of signifiers (see his appendix to “The Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’”). This changes drastically once he no longer takes the real seriously, meaning that he takes the real outside of the seriality of the signifier, the real as such. At that point, he encounters causality as something completely different from determinism.

Determinism belongs to Aristotle's *automaton*, but causality is something different, to be understood as *tuché*. In Seminar XI, Lacan introduces the notion of “cause” as what is to be looked for in something undetermined.<sup>41</sup> “In short, there is a cause only in something that does not work” (Seminar 11, 22; Seminar XI, 25). Later on in Seminar XI, this undetermined cause is understood as the traumatic real, that part of the drive that cannot be represented. In this revised theory, the body occupies a completely new place.<sup>42</sup> As a cause, it obliges and constrains us to “an appointment with a real that eludes us” (Seminar 11, 53; Seminar XI, 53), the real that lies beyond *automaton*, and that comes down to that part which cannot be assimilated, in the sense of that which is not mediated or represented (Seminar 11, 53–55; Seminar XI, 53–55).

In this sense, the idea of cause implies the idea of failure, of something that does not happen, thus causing something else to fill the scene: a failure of the

symbolic to cover over something real. There is an indecision at the heart of the real, that is, a contingency. It implies that the body, through the drive, has a central causal impact on the unconscious as such: “For what the unconscious does is to show us the gap through which neurosis associates with a real—a real that may well not be determined” (my translation; Seminar 11, 22; Seminar XI, 25–26). This real is the drive in its status of unrepresentability (Seminar 11, 60; Seminar XI, 59), hence, its association with trauma. The aspect of failure appears in the negative denominations used by Lacan: “the unrealized” and “the unborn,” thus permitting him to make explicit a direct connection with the “un” of the unconscious (Seminar 11, 22–23, 26, 32; Seminar XI, 25–26, 28, 32).

Lacan’s theory of causality permits him to develop a status for the unconscious, a status homologous to what takes place at the level of the subject.<sup>43</sup> In the second point of my conclusion, I will discuss this homology more extensively. Indeed, in the wake of this new theory of causality, the unconscious is described by Lacan as *une béance causale*, a causal gap characterized by a pulsating movement. The unconscious is a perpetual opening and closing of a gap in which something fails to be realized. A typical example is a slip of the tongue, but ultimately this goes for every production of the unconscious, the subject as such included (Seminar 11, 130–31; Seminar XI, 119–20), hence, the pre-ontological status of the unconscious: “it” fails to materialize; all emphasis has to be put on this opening and closing (Seminar 11, 29–32; Seminar XI, 32–33).

Thus, the conclusion is that it is not only the symbolic order that has a determining effect; the real as such has a causal function, and the two come together in an ever-impossible relationship.

Of course, this is all merely a description of a rather peculiar process of nonrealization. So far, causality as such is evoked, but not much more than that. How does the real function as a cause? Lacan answers this question by redefining his ideas of the body and lack. His new theory begins when he interprets the real of the body as the cause, because this real implies a primordial lack. This lack or loss is logically prior to the lack in the signifying chain between mother and child (exchange value), although it operates retroactively.

The real of the organism functions as the cause, in the sense that it contains a primordial loss that precedes the loss in the chain of signifiers. Which loss? The loss of eternal life, which paradoxically enough is lost at the moment of birth, that is, birth as a sexed being, because of meiosis (Seminar 11, 205; Seminar XI, 187). In order to explain this ultimate incomprehensibility of the ultimate as such, Lacan constructs the myth of the “lamella,” which is nothing but object *a* in its pure form: the life instinct, the primordial form of the libido. As an idea, it goes back to a biological fact: nonsexual reproduction implies, in principle, the possibility of eternal life (as is the case of single-celled organisms, which can be brought about through cloning), and sexual reproduction implies, in principle, the death of the individual. Each organism wants to undo this loss, and each tries to return to the previous state of being. According to



Freud, this was the basic characteristic of the drive, to be read as the life and death drive. With Lacan, the dead facet of the death drive is easier to grasp: indeed, the return to eternal life inevitably implies the death of the sexed individual.

The reaction to this primordial loss—the attempt to return and its defensive elaboration—takes place at the level of the symbolico-imaginary, which is at the same time the level of sexualization, of gender formation. It has to be noted that this sexualization comes down to a “phallicization.” This means that the first, real lack is “answered,” as was the second lack, the one in the symbolic. Thus the primordial loss at the level of the organism is reinterpreted as a phallic lack in the relationship between the subject and Other. Object *a* becomes associated with the bodily borderlines, the orifices through which other losses take place. Moreover, this phallic interpretation of object *a* implies that this original lack and loss are introduced by the mother/child relationship into the man/woman relationship; this is the effect of the Oedipal passage (Seminar 11, 64, 103–4, 180; Seminar XI, 62, 95–96, 164). From this point onward, the drive becomes a partial drive, containing an ever-present mixture of life and death drives.

As a result, we end with an interaction between a circular but not reciprocal determination (Seminar 11, 207; Seminar XI, 188). Loss at the level of the real is the cause through which individual life—the not-whole—is turned into one elongated, elaborated attempt at returning to the previous eternal life: infinity. This attempt receives an elaboration at another level, in the verbal relationship between mother and child, and still later, at a third level, between man and woman. In the meantime, the original lack is reinterpreted in phallic terms. This attempt to return takes place within the symbolico-imaginary, which means that it is determined in a systematic way (automaton), and that it will run inevitably into the original lack in the real (*tuché*). The automatic chain can never produce an adequate answer because of this structural incompatibility. This in itself leads the chain to further production, and so on.

It is this kind of failed interaction that brings us to the idea of the not-whole and the accompanying ontological process, instead of the classical binary.

*Homologous Structure: A Circular but Nonreciprocal Relationship* Seminar XX brings us the ever-failing relationship between an articulated whole that contains a nonarticulated part, by which the whole is turned into a not-whole, facing infinity. This description can be recognized quite easily in Lacan's previous theory on the unconscious and causality. It brings us the principle of a homologous structure, described as circular but nonreciprocal (Seminar 11, 207; Seminar XI, 188). This structure contains a kind of development, although it has to be read backwards: the “primary” element becomes delineated retroactively through the operation of the “secondary” element, in which the primary is included, albeit as a foreign body. The relationship does not stop at that point; quite the contrary. The not-whole whole insistently attempts to colonize this

foreign body that ex-sists in the not-whole itself. These attempts produce the exact opposite effect: instead of assimilation of the “other” part, this other becomes confirmed in its otherness, although at another level. At that other level, the whole process can start all over again, with the same (lack of) result.

Thus Lacan acknowledges a homologous structure between body, unconscious, and subject.<sup>44</sup> This structure insists in terms of opening and closing, border structure, gap, split, and so on. As a principle, it turns the relation between life and death into a circular but nonreciprocal interaction. The loss at the level of the real transforms life into one prolonged attempt to return to the preceding eternal life. From a structural point of view, this leaves us with two elements, one of which serves as a force of attraction, while the other wants to return and move forward at the same time. Their interaction is staged each time at a different level, which instates and endorses their nonrelationship—the two borders can never meet. As early as 1948, Lacan had already written that in mankind there is a primordial discordance in the very core of the organism.<sup>45</sup> The final result of this primordial cleft is the nonexistence of the sexual relationship.

My attempt to describe and summarize this homologous structure runs as follows (Seminar 11, 203–13; Seminar XI, 185–93):

1. The advent of the living: the opening and closing of life at birth.

The advent of sexually differentiated life-forms implies the loss of eternal life. This loss is summarized by Lacan in his concept of object *a*, meaning the loss of the life instinct. This eternal life, *Zoë* in classical Greek, functions as a force of attraction for the individual life, *Bios*, which tries to return. The price to pay for this return is the loss of this individual life as such, which explains the other tendency, the one that flees from it in the opposite direction. The so-called solution implies and endorses a structurally defined impossible relationship. Indeed, *Bios* tries to join *Zoë* through sexual reproduction, thus entailing a necessary failure and even repeating and endorsing the original loss. From this moment onward, life and death drives are fused.

2. The advent of the I: the opening and closing of the body.

This is the primary alienation of the mirror stage. The living being acquires a first mastery, a first identity through the externally imposed, unified image of the body. This unified body will be translated in the master signifier, “I,” to be understood as “*m’être à moi-même/maître à moi-même*” (to be myself, to belong to myself, to be the master of myself, Seminar XVII, 178), the “I” which has a body and has lost its being. This “I” will never cease to try to join its body, that is, the being of its body, but then again the price to pay for this joining is the disappearance of the “I,” hence, the tendency to flee in the other direction as well. Finally, this solution will provide the “I” only with the body of the Other, thus endorsing the loss of its being.

3. The advent of the subject: the opening and closing of signifiers.

The ever-divided subject appears and disappears under the signifiers of the Other, aiming at answering the desire of that Other. From a structural viewpoint, such a process has to end in failure, because the answer will be given in terms of signifiers, while object *a* belongs to a different order and is lacking, precisely due to the introduction of the signifier. Again, as a solution, it implies a structurally determined nonrelationship, because the attempt of the subject to join the Other must necessarily pass through the signifier, thus repeating and endorsing the original division of this subject.

Thus considered, the subject comes onto the stage as the last implementation of this homologous structure, containing all of the previous ones. With the former, there is no question of a subject, unless in the form of what Lacan calls "*un sujet acéphale*," a headless subject. If we continue this line of thought, it seems reasonable to expect here a fourth "advent," that is, the advent of gender, through which object *a* and the subject would be provided with a specific gender. This is what the Oedipus complex does, in its own particular way, by interpreting the original loss in terms of castration. As a result, the Oedipal structure inaugurates a gender differentiation that is not a genuine one, because it is based solely on the presence of the phallic One's absence. The phallic interpretation is applied retroactively to all preceding advents, meaning that each loss becomes interpreted phallicly. It is during this process that the body is constructed, the body that we have (not the body that we are), clothed in an ever-secondary gender identity. The originally circular but not reciprocal relationship between life and death, between jouissance and subject, is reproduced and worked over between man and woman.

In this way, the gap between jouissance and Other, between being and sense, is reproduced in the gap between woman and man. Moreover, this repetition produces the same effect: whatever efforts the subject makes to join his or her body via the Other of language, he or she will never succeed, because the gap is precisely due to this Other of language. Whatever efforts the subject (whether male or female) makes to join woman via the phallic relationship, it will never succeed, because the cleft is precisely due to the phallic signifier. The impossible relationship between the subject and its drive reappears in the impossible relationship between a man and a woman, on the one hand, and the not-whole part of woman, on the other hand.

In my opinion, this is the complete elaboration of the ontological structure announced by Lacan in 1949 in "The Mirror Stage."<sup>46</sup> The human being is always divided between something that it is not or does not have and something that it will never be or have—"your money or your life" (Seminar 11, 212; Seminar XI, 193). It is this division that insists as a border structure and corroborates a homology between body, drive, unconscious, and subject. This is the only "ontology" that humans have.

Finally, Lacan's refusal of the binary opposition is a refusal of the reduction by and to the one and an attempt to think beyond this phallus-cy. It is his refusal of the one that always leads to a false "*d'eux*," two, that is, a false binary, and an attempt to think a "*un-en-moins*," a one that is not-whole and faces a never-ending dialectic. This thinking, he says, takes courage and has to do with love. To keep this dimension of the undetermined wide open testifies to Lacan's courage, contrary to the "eyes wide shut" classical attempts of recuperation, which always create a false sense of certainty. Every interpretation of this Lacanian theory that leads to yet another binary misses the point and is merely another form of the return of the repressed.

## NOTES

1. "Hâtez-vous lentement; et, sans perdre courage/Vingt fois sur le métier remettez votre ouvrage," Boileau, *L'Art Poétique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 161. In Pope's translation: "Gently make haste, of labour not afraid/A hundred times consider what you've said."

2. All references to Seminar XX given in this chapter are to the original French pagination, included in the margins of the English translation by Bruce Fink.

3. This clinical experience can easily be found in Freud's case studies; in his four actual clinical cases, it is not too difficult to find the infantile drive root, or fixation, as Freud calls it.

4. This idea goes back a long way: "You can see the difficulty of topological representation. The reason is that *das Ding* is at the center in that sense that it is excluded. [It is] something that is *entfremdet*, foreign to me, although it is at the heart of me." In French, "Vous voyez la difficulté de la représentation topologique. Car ce *das Ding* est justement au centre au sens qu'il est exclu. [C'est] quelque chose qui est *entfremdet*, étranger à moi tout en étant au coeur du moi" (Seminar VII, 87/71).

5. "In the psyche, there is nothing by which the subject may situate himself as a male or female being. In his psyche, the subject situates only equivalents of the function of reproduction—activity and passivity, which by no means represent it in an exhaustive way. [T]he ways of what one must do as man or as woman are entirely abandoned to the drama, to the scenario, which is placed in the field of the Other—which, strictly speaking, is the Oedipus complex. [T]he human being always has to learn from scratch from the Other what he has to do, as man or as woman" (Seminar XI, 204/186).

6. The identification made by Lacan between the symbolic order, the master signifier, the phallic signifier, and the One might not be clear to some readers. I understand it as follows. The symbolic order as a system is based on difference (see Saussure). The first signifier to denote difference as such is the phallic signifier, hence, the symbolic order is based on the phallic signifier. As a signifier, it is empty, and it does not create a difference between two different genders. It creates a mere difference between the One and the not-one. This is its major effect on the symbolic order: it operates in a unifying way, by applying a dichotomous reasoning, one or not one. Lacan returns to this at the very end of Seminar XX, when he questions the origins of this idea of one (63–64, 130–31). See also J. Lacan, *Television, a Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, and A. Michelson, ed. J. Copjec (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 10; J. Lacan, *Télévision* (Paris: Seuil, 1973), p. 22.

7. Lacan's theory of the body is quite complicated; the shift in Seminar XX has to be understood mainly in relation to Seminar XI and Seminar XXII, *R.S.I.* I have commented on this evolution in my paper "Subject and Body—Lacan's Struggle with the Real," in *The Letter: Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis* 17 (autumn 1999): 79–119.

8. The transition from use-value to exchange value is one of the major themes of Seminar IV.

9. "The common factor of the *a* is the fact that it is associated with the orifices of the body" (my translation; "Le facteur commun du *a*, c'est d'être lié aux orifices du corps" (Seminar XXIII, January 21, 1975, unpublished Seminar).

10. Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols., trans. J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press) vol. XXIII, *Moses and Monotheism*, 71–73, 126, 129. Hereafter, all references to the *Standard Edition* will be given as SE, followed by the title, volume, and page numbers.

11. S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, SE XVIII, 32–35.

12. All references in this paragraph are to Seminar XI. It should be noted here that Lacan develops his theory on the real in quite a hesitating fashion, the result being that from time to time he speaks about "reality" when he is talking about the real.

13. This is my translation, because the English translation introduces a different interpretation; the original reads: "C'est l'Autre qui fait le pas-tout, justement en ce qu'il est la part du pas-savant-du-tout dans ce pas-tout." Indeed, "pas-savant-du-tout" implies at least two meanings: "not knowing of the whole" and "not knowing at all."

14. S. Freud (1895), "Project for a Scientific Psychology," SE I, 295–397. The idea of "Bahnungen" is used almost constantly in Freud's text. See also *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, SE XVIII, 26.

15. See Freud's letters to Fliess, dated May 30, 1896, and November 2, 1896 (SE I, 229–40).

16. S. Freud, "Repression," SE XIV, 146; *The Ego and the Id*, SE XIX, 60–62; *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, SE XXII, 15, 70–72.

17. S. Freud, "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia," SE XII, 66–68; Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 18; Freud, "Repression," p. 146.

18. S. Freud (1926), *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, SE XX, 94; Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, pp. 27 ff. It is fascinating to see how this problem is present right from the start in Freud's theory. As early as in "The Neuro-psychoses of Defense" (1894), Freud struggles with the relationship between what he calls at that time "the memory-traces" of "repressed ideas." Repression takes place at a "traumatic moment" and operates on the "sum of excitation," "the source of the affect." But he is left with the question of whether these processes are of a psychical nature or "are physical processes whose psychical consequences present themselves as if what is expressed by the terms 'separation of the idea from its affect' and 'false connection' of the latter had really taken place" (SE III, 50–53). In later terms, is the drive inscribed psychically, or are we facing right from the start a fundamental incompatibility between the drive and representation as such, thus constituting the nucleus of the unconscious as a gap, a failure operating in a causal way? This is the option that Lacan takes from Seminar XI onward.

19. S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, SE V, 525.

20. Freud describes the dream as the externalization of an internal process, in which drive impulses function as the source. The dream tries to express the unconscious impulse, that is, bodily changes, through the preconscious dream-wish. S. Freud, "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams," SE XIV, 222–26.

21. S. Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, SE XXIII, 71–73, 126, 129. See also a letter to Fliess, where he states that fantasies go back to “things heard at an early age but understood only later” (April 6, 1897, SE I, 244).

22. J. Laplanche and S. Leclaire, “L’Inconscient: une étude psychanalytique,” in *L’inconscient: VIème colloque de Bonneval*, ed. H. Ey (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer), pp. 95–130. In English, see “The Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Study,” *Yale French Studies* 48 (1972): 118–175.

23. For a discussion of this point, see P. Verhaeghe and F. Declercq, “Lacan’s Goal of Analysis: Le Sinthome or the Feminine Way,” in *Reinventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan*, ed. Luke Thurston (London: Rebus Press, forthcoming). See also F. Declercq, “Het Reële bij Lacan, over de finaliteit van de psychoanalytische kuur” (Gent: Idesça, 2000).

24. For the explanation of this neologism, “dit-manche,” see the excellent comments made by Bruce Fink in his translation of Seminar XX, ed. J.-A. Miller (New York: Norton, 1998), notes 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 (pp. 97–98).

25. J. Lacan, “Propos sur la Causalité Psychique,” *Écrits*, pp. 160–61. Lacan’s critique of the body/mind impasse is already elaborated on in this paper, dating from 1946.

26. S. Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, SE II, 286–87.

27. S. Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, SE VII, 207; “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love,” SE XI, 180 ff.

28. These remarks warrant a fuller study of their own. The most beautiful conclusion on them comes, of course, from Lacan himself: “Only love allows jouissance to condescend to desire” (Seminar X, March 13, 1963).

29. S. Freud, “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense,” SE XXIII.

30. S. Freud, SE VII, 168.

31. S. Freud, SE II, 67–70 (note).

32. S. Freud, SE II, 69 (note).

33. S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, SE XVIII. It should be noted that Freud’s discussion of repetition and repetition compulsion is rather confusing, in that he mixes two kinds of repetition: the repetition of the signifier, “automaton,” which indeed becomes compulsive when a trauma is concerned (hence, traumatic dreams), as a way of trying to cope with the real of the trauma. On the other hand, there is the repetition of the real as such that time and again reappears in an ex-sistent way, where the chain of signifiers meets its limit. This is tuché. For a discussion, see Seminar XI, chapter 4.

34. S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, SE V, 488–508, 525.

35. S. Freud, “Constructions in Analysis,” SE XXIII, 259; see also “The Unconscious,” SE XIV, 187.

36. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, SE XVIII, 49. *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, SE XXIII, 148–49.

37. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, SE XIX, 46, 59.

38. Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, SE XX, 125.

39. Freud, SE II, 290.

40. Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” SE XIX, 168; “The Future of an Illusion,” SE XXI, 54–56.

41. J. Lacan, Seminar XI, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller (New York: Norton, 1978), trans. A. Sheridan. All references are given in the chapter itself; “Seminar 11” refers to the English translation, “Seminar XI” to the original French version.

42. New, compared to the body-image, received from the Other during the mirror stage.

43. "At the level of the unconscious, there is something that is homologous on all points to what happens at the level of the subject" (my translation, Seminar XI, 27; the original reads as follows: "au niveau de l'inconscient, il y a quelque chose en tous points homologue à ce qui se passe au niveau du sujet"; see also Seminar 11, 20–23; Seminar XI, 23–25).

44. "Well! It is insofar as something in the apparatus of the body is structured in the same way, it is because of the topological unity of the gaps in play, that the drive assumes its role in the functioning of the unconscious" (Seminar 11, 181; Seminar XI, 165).

45. This ontology can be summarized by one sentence of his first paper on the mirror stage: "In man, however, this relation to nature is altered by a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord" (*Écrits*, 96/4).

46. The implications of this principle go very far indeed. While writing this chapter, my thoughts went back and forward all the time. To give but a few examples: What about racism? Sexism? And heteronormativity, as its latest implementation? (To be continued.)

**This page intentionally left blank.**